Publications
Economic interdependence and economic sanctions: a case study of European Union sanctions on Russia
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 33(2): 229-251. (with Zachary Selden)
Economic sanctions impose costs on sender as well as target states, and those costs increase with the degree of interdependence between the states in question. We test the hypothesis that EU member states that are more economically interdependent with Russia would be the most opposed to the imposition of sanctions on Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine in 2013–2014. However, an analysis of the debate over the imposition of sanctions shows the opposite: a modest positive correlation between economic interdependence and support for the sanctions among EU member states. This finding further calls into question the fundamental linkage between economic self interest and conflict avoidance among interdependent states.
International Relations 38(2): 165-191.
This article analyzes the national security strategies of EU member states in the 2009–2018 period, and conceptualizes three security strategies EU member states have adopted toward Russia – flexible accommodation, cooperative deterrence, and calibrated confrontation. It tests strategic culture hypotheses against those of realism and commercial liberalism to explain the variation of EU member states’ security strategies toward Russia. While a realist explanation would predict EU member states geographically proximate to Russia would possess more confrontational security strategies, geographic proximity and confrontational security strategies toward Russia are not positively correlated. Bilateral economic interdependence with Russia, the presence of populist parties in EU member states governing coalitions, and EU member states’ alignment or status as an occupied state during the Cold War also do not explain EU member states’ security strategies toward Russia. A more consistent explanation of the variance in EU member states’ policy on Russia revolves around the strategic culture of the state in question. States with a more Atlanticist perspective tend to be more confrontation with Russia than their more Europeanist counterparts, regardless of geographic proximity or economic interdependence with Russia.
Competing visions for the EU’s southern strategy: Restraint, preventative engagement, and selective intervention
Mediterranean Politics 28(4): 580-610.
The most powerful European Union (EU) member states have suffered devastating terrorist attacks in the past decades and identify Islamist terrorism as one of the most pressing threats to their national security. They recognize that instability in the southern neighbourhood has exacerbated the threat Islamist terrorism poses to their national security. Adopting an intergovernmental approach, I argue that member states’ southern strategies are a product of threat perceptions and policy response preferences. This article creates a typology of security strategies through using content analysis to categorize EU member states’ threat perceptions and policy response preferences as indicated in national security strategies produced in 2009–2018 period. Based on my analysis of member states’ threat perceptions and policy response preferences to threats emanating in the southern neighbourhood, I conceptualize three southern security strategies: restraint, preventative engagement, and selective intervention. Based on this typology, I identify the EU member states’ southern security strategy. Focusing particularly on the most powerful EU member states, namely the EU-5 , I then apply this typology to make some tentative predictions on the shifts in the EU’s southern strategy post-Brexit. I expect the EU’s southern security strategy to shift towards one of selective intervention in the post-Brexit period.